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The Maastricht Train: Slowing Down for
Sharp Curves
I. Introduction
Referendums rest at the heart of a democratic philosophy. They
entail a submission of law to the direct vote of the people. Democ-
racy, in combination with free-market economics, has become the
predominant basis of political institutions in the world today. Capi-
talistic Democracies recognize the efficiency of economies of scale
available through modern technology and economic cooperation. In
seeking to attain the prosperity, growth, and the derivative security
inherent in economies of scale, many nations have banded together
to form multilateral regional organizations.1
Among the largest regional organizations, the European Com-
munity (EC) has achieved the greatest level of integration.' Lessons
from the European experience are studied by all other institutions
seeking prosperity through unification. For the EC, the next step to-
ward unification is ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Maastricht
attempts to go beyond the present Common Market by harmonizing
economic, social, and political laws. In an effort to ratify the Maas-
tricht Treaty, one of the EC's largest member-states, France, held a
referendum. On September 20, 1992, French voters were asked, "Do
you approve the draft law put to the French people by the president
of the republic authorizing ratification of the Treaty on European
Union?"3
This Comment will focus on the legal ramifications to individu-
als and institutions, throughout France, Europe and the world
caused by the use of this most basic democratic tool - the referen-
dum. Sections II and III will briefly describe the history and aims of
1. Because the scope of this Comment is concerned with modern developments in the
laws of nations, the historic unification of federal nation-states is not included here. Modern
communications and transport have greatly increased the ability of sovereigns to transact.
These developments have altered the complexity and nature of integration. However, the les-
sons of history should not be forgotten. See. e.g., 24 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
96-97 (1975) (United States 1776-89), and II FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 178
(1975) (Germany 1834-71).
2. The twelve Member-States of the EC are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom.
3. French Voters Narrowly Back 'Maastricht' Treaty on Closer European Unity, FACTS
ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Sept. 24, 1992, at 705-Al [hereinafter FACTS ON FILE] available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File.
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the European Community and of the Treaty of Maastricht. Sections
IV, V, and VI will discuss the potential consequences of the referen-
dum as predicted by supporters and opponents of the Treaty before
the ballots were cast. By detailing the response of the leaders of the
EC, this Comment will focus, in sections VII and VIII, on the refer-
endum's effects upon the individual, with particular attention to the
principle of subsidiarity. Sections IX and, X will view the effects of
the referendum upon institutions in France, the Community, and the
world.
II. The European Community
The drive to integrate the European economies began over forty
years ago when the nations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands established the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC). The intent of the ECSC was to cre-
ate a common market for coal and steel commodities.5 As a result of
the ECSC's success, the same six nations later joined to form the
European Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome in
1957.6 The purpose of forming this "ever closer union"7 was to avoid
Franco-German conflict by replacing nationalism with prosperity.,
The treaty proposed to create a free trade area by removing all tar-
riffs and quotas by 1968. 9 In order to accomplish this goal, the
Treaty sought to insure the so-called "four freedoms": freedom of
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. 10
A similar market was formed when the same six nations signed
the Euratom Treaty concurrently with the EEC Treaty. The
Euratom Treaty purported to regulate the production and develop-
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC
TREATY] pmbl. Because of the vast amount of legal material already written on the EC, its
history is only briefly summarized here. See generally OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF
THE EUR. COMMUNITIES: LUX., THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW (3d ed. 1991) (introductory
materials on the creation and interpretation of EC law), and EMILE NOEL, OFFICE FOR OFFI-
CIAL PUBLICATION OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES: LUX.. WORKING TOGETHER - THE INSTITU-
TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1991).
5. John Daly & Barbara Wickens, Continental Divide: The EC Stumble on the Path to
Unity, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 28, 1992, at 38, 40.
6. Terry R.Broderick and Arnold B. Calmann, Introduction to a New Europe: A Pri-
mer for 1992, INT'L BUS. LAW., Jan. 1992, at 9.
7. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]
pmbl.
8. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 18, 1992) (Deborah Amos
reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File [hereinafter Morning Edition (Sept.
18)]. Transcripts are available from NPR, 2025 M Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 tran-
script inquiries at (202) 822-2323.
9. For a general discussion of the evolution of regional organizations from a free trade
area, through a customs union, single market and monetary union, to a political union see,
Louis F..Del Duca, Lessons for Developing Regional Organizations - the European Commu-
nity Experience - an Anatomy for Regional Organizations, I I DICK. J. INT'L L. (forthcom-
ing August 1993).
10. EEC TREATY art. 3.
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ment of nuclear energy.1 From their inception, the EEC, the ECSC,
and Euratom shared common judicial and legislative institutions: the
Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European
Parliament. In 1968, the Communities merged their executive insti-
tutions to form a single European Council and a single European
Commission.12 The Communities are now collectively referred to as
the EC, but each of the original Treaties remain in force. With the
success of the EC, other countries requested, and were granted, ac-
cession: first Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) in
1973; then Greece in 1981; and, most recently, Portugal and Spain
in 1986.11
A multitude of non-tarriff barriers, however, remained to re-
strict the free movement of resources."' In June 1985, the Commis-
sion of the EC submitted the White Paper,15 which included some
300 legislative proposals to eliminate those fiscal, physical, and tech-
nical non-tarriff barriers. 6 In February of 1986, the 12 member-
states unanimously signed the Single European Act (SEA), approv-
ing the White Paper's timetables to significantly amend the Treaty
of Rome. 7 The majority of the White Paper's proposals contained in
the SEA have already been implemented, and the remainder will au-
tomatically go into effect January 1, 1993.18
The SEA created a single market, the so-called Common Mar-
ket, of 342 million residents and a 4.04 trillion dollar gross national
product.' 9 Leaders of the Member-States continued the process to-
ward economic unification by signing the Treaty of Maastricht in
December 1991.20 The EC leaders intended Maastricht to go into
effect with the 1993 automatic implementation of the SEA, however
ratification of the controversial Treaty was held up by the parlia-
ments of several Member-States.21
I1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM
TREATY] pmbl.
12. TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION OF THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES [MERGER TREATY].
13. JANET S. ZAGORIN. BAKER & MCKENZIE. EUROPE 1992: NAVIGATING NEW WA-
TERS § 1 (1990).
14. Id. § VI(A).
15. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85)310 final.
16. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 40.
17. Zagorin, supra note 13, § VI(A).
18. Alan Riding, Europe Awaits Verdict on Treaty by French Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Riding, Europe].
19. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 44. Gross national product is a measure of all
goods and services produced within an area, plus the value of that area's net exports.
20. Id. at 40.
21. The terms of the Maastricht summit require ratification by all 12 Member-States.
European Community, French Voters Approve Unity Treaty But 'Hurdles Still Remain,' Offi-
cial Says. 1992 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 184, at D-3 (Sept. 22, 1992) available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File [hereinafter Hurdles]. Denmark and Ireland were
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III. The Treaty of Maastricht
In December 1991, the leaders of the twelve EC Member-States
met in the Dutch town of Maastricht to travel further down the
track toward economic and monetary union. 2 The Treaty of Maas-
tricht aims to form closer economic, social, and political ties. The
Treaty covers a broad range of economic provisions, including a sin-
gle European currency, coordinated fiscal policies and a central
bank.23 Maastricht expressly recognizes EC competence to legislate
in social areas -such as education, the environment and scientific re-
search and development.24 The Treaty also outlines provisions for de-
termining a common security policy that might eventually lead to a
common European defense.25
In order for Maastricht to become law, it requires ratification
by all twelve Member-States. 26 With the approval of the British
House of Commons and the passage of a second Danish referendum
on ratification in May 1993, all twelve EC nations have effectively
ratified the Treaty. 27 However, first referendum on ratification
nearly derailed the Treaty when it failed in June 1992 by the narrow
margin of 50.66% against further integration. 28 The Danish rejec-
tion of Maastricht in June 1992 led French President Francois Mit-
terand to call a referendum in order to help get Maastricht back on
track. 9 At the time, a referendum seemed a politically safe decision,
because opinion polls in France showed as much as a seventy percent
majority in favor of Maastricht.30 Between the President's June 4,
1992 announcement and the September 20, 1992 referendum, how-
ever, debate closed that gap considerably."1 The referendum passed
by only the narrowest of margins.3 2 Passage of the French referen-
required by domestic law to ratify by referendum. For the other 10, parliamentary ratification
was either sufficient or, as in Germany, constitutionally required. Riding, Europe, supra note
14 at A12.
22. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 40. The denomination of the European Commu-
nity would thus become the European Union.
23. Id. These provisions are intended to allow the EC to move from the present single
market to a monetary union. Del Duca, supra note 9, (manuscript at 4-6).
24. Andrew Marshall, The Treaty of Maastricht, THE INDEPENDENT, at 102, arts. IlI-
IV (Oct. I1, 1992) (an annotated version of the Treaty, with an admittedly British slant, but
translated into layman's terms) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INDPNT File.
25. Id. art. VI.
26. Riding, Europe, supra note 18, at A12.
27. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, May 20, 1993) (Robert
Siegel reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File [hereinafter All Things Con-
sidered (May 20)].
28. Del Duca, supra note 9.
29. George F. Will, European Union Idea Losing its Luster, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept.
17, 1992, at CI8.
30. Morning Edition (Sept. 18). supra note 8.
31. Will, supra note 29.
32. Results ranged from 51.05 % (Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 40) to as narrow as
50.66% in favor of the Treaty, with a turnout of approximately 70%,. French radio reported
that the difference between those in favor and those against the Treaty was a mere 540,000 in
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dum was considered "critical" to the success of the Treaty. 3 Al-
though ratification in France was achieved, the narrow margin of the
vote leaves many questions unanswered regarding the next stage in
the process of integration.
IV. Consequences of a "No" Vote
Most analysts agree that, if the French voters had voted no to
the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty would almost certainly have
never gained legal status. Otherwise, there are almost as many dif-
fering opinions of the consequences of a no vote as there are ana-
lysts. Common themes range from the opinion that rejection of the
Treaty "would slow but not end European integration" '34 to the belief
that "four decades of work probably would have fallen to pieces with
irreparable damage. ''35
Others believed a no vote would have "wave[d] goodbye to the
Maastricht treaty and quite possibly the exchange rate mechanism
too.""6 Supporters of European unity, such as German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, disagreed at least as to the impact a no vote would
have had on existing institutions like the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM).3 7 A no vote, however, would certainly have come at an inop-
portune time for the governments of Western Europe, especially
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. which are facing reces-
sion and growing unpopularity at home.3 8
V. Consequences of a "Yes" Vote
The consequences of passage brought no less diverse opinions.
Those who thought a no vote would encourage currency speculation
(and hence a breakdown of the ERM) naturally thought a yes would
serve to stabilize the markets.3 9 Some believed a yes vote would
serve as a political weapon with which the EC Trade Commissioner
could make another attempt at reaching a global solution to the
problems of the Uruguay Round."' A yes vote would restore a mea-
a nation of over 80 million people. Hurdles, supra note 21.
33. Morning Edition (Sept. 18), supra note 8.
34. Rejection of Maastricht by France Would Not End Integration in Europe, 1992
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 173-D3 (Sept. 22, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, DREXEC File (quoting John Yochelson of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies).
35. Close Call for European Unity, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Sept. 22, 1992,
at A8 (quoting Italian Prime Minister Guiliano Amato).
36. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
37. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 39. The ERM is a set of rules promulgated by the
EC Monetary Committee to collectively protect the currency values of the Member-States.
38. Riding, Europe, supra note 18 [32].
39. Hurdles, supra note 21.
40. Id. See also infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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sure of the Community's shattered confidence in the ERM."1 A yes
would also lend renewed strength, as President Mitterand had origi-
nally anticipated, toward overcoming the remaining obstacles to
Maastricht. 2
Others believed passage could bring about violent results. Be-
cause economic integration entails a surrender of the French franc to
a European bureaucracy, some said the people of Paris would storm
the Banc Nationale du Paris."3 Some analysts predicted that cur-
rency speculators might face a similar fate to that of their predeces-
sors who were beheaded for speculating against the value of the
franc.44
VI. The Debate
The debate leading up to the referendum caused much confu-
sion because the same arguments were often used both for and
against the Treaty. 5 For instance, the speculators' run on the cur-
rency markets was used to show both the need for a unified currency
and that Maastricht could not assure stability.'6 Moreover, each side
exaggerated arguments, resorted to fear tactics, 4 7 and skewed the fo-
cus of the question before the voters. "8
The focus of the referendum changed from Maastricht to a vote
on France itself. Concern over the slumping French economy, rising
unemployment, and the President's close association with Maastricht
changed the focus of the referendum by creating a referendum on
Mitterand rather than ratification.' 9 The civil war in the Balkans,
violence in Germany toward foreigners, and unstable currencies were
the pigments of a dark portrayal used by the yes camp." The no
camp countered by arguing that the EC had already shown it was
incapable of handling these problems.5 Proponents of the referen-
dum argued that Maastricht would serve to tie a reunified Germany
to Europe.5 1 Opponents responded that Maastricht would only
41. French Hunters, Fishers Set to Vote "No" to Maastricht, REUTERS, Sept. 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File [hereinafter French Hunters].
42. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
43. The Banc Nationale happens to be located in the Place de la Bastille * the birth-
place of the French Revolution. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast,
Sept. 18, 1992) (Alice Furlaud reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
44. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
45. Riding, Europe, supra note 18, at A12. Cf. Marc Fisher, Denmark Approves Euro-
pean Unity Treaty by 57 Percent Vote, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993, at A21.
46. Riding, Europe. supra note 18, at A12.
47. Id.
48. See Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 42.
49. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
50. Riding, Europe. supra note 18, at A12.
5I. Id.
52. Will, supra note 29.
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anchor Europe to Germany. 53
Yet more substantive concerns did remain central to the debate.
Fears of relinquishing economic and political sovereignty to anony-
mous 'Eurocrats' in Brussels54 lay behind questions of unemploy-
ment, crime, and immigration policy.5 5 On the other hand, many
supported the proposition that greater unification would contribute
to bring about economic prosperity. That prosperity would, in turn,
supplant the violence of political nationa lism. 5
Moreover, bringing Europe's best minds together in Brussels
could assist in solving internal problems. Because national bounda-
ries can aggravate certain social problems by their very existence, 57
specialists centered in Brussels with the power to work above na-
tional boundaries, could better address such problems. 58
VII. EC Leaders Respond
A. Germany Cut Interest Rates to Support the Referendum
The substantive arguments that Maastricht is a solution to the
problems of war, economic strife, and unemployment eventually pre-
vailed, but in the last days before the vote, many people were not
certain the referendum would pass. Traders59 and financial institu-
tions"0 passively awaited the outcome. The economic climate sur-
rounding German interest rates made many investors cautious. The
German central bank, or Bundesbank, had been steadily raising in-
terest rates as a result of the high costs of German re-unification. 1
But high German interest rates affect interest rates around the
world; slowing economic growth by increasing the cost of borrowing
for capital investment and by undermining investors' confidence in
other European currencies. 62
On September 14, 1992, the German central bank cut its inter-
est rates after five years of continual increase.63 Occurring just one
53. Id.
54. Brussels, Belgium is the legislative headquarters of the EC, and as such, is often
seen as the capitol of Europe and symbol of its bureaucracy.
55. French Hunters, supra note 41.
56. Even the most ardent supporters of unification agree that care must be taken to
preserve national cultural independence.
57. For instance, consumer protection and criminal extradition, because defective prod-
ucts and dangerous criminals easily cross national boundaries, but their victims may not.
58. See generally, Del Duca, supra note 9 (manuscript at 6-47) (describing the EC's
approach to solving problems of harmonization).
59. Morning Edition (Sept. 18), supra note 8.
60. London Stocks Close Firmer but Below Highs, REUTERS, Aug. 19, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FINRPT File.
61. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 38.
62. Id.
63. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 14, 1992) (Bob Edwards
reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
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week before the French referendum, this extraordinary move was in-
tended to make the German mark less attractive to foreign investors,
thereby bolstering other European currencies. 4 Many analysts felt
that the Bundesbank was attempting to strengthen French support
for the Treaty.6 5 The close ties and active communications between
French President Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
preceding the decrease in interest rates support this theory.
B. Italy, Spain, and U.K. Forced to Devalue Currency
What German leaders intended as a gesture of conciliation and
support, however, backfired spectacularly. Currency traders took
the rate cut as a sign of weakness and attacked. 7 The traders sought
to invest in the strongest currency, betting against the weaker Euro-
pean currencies, such as the Italian lira and the Spanish peseta, and
buying more Deutschmarks6 8 The European central banks at-
tempted to halt the currency market's tailspin by buying up their
own currencies and selling marks. 69 But compared to the estimated
800 million dollars of foreign currency exchanged per day, even the
combined efforts of the central banks were but a drop in the
bucket.70 The European banks' efforts to shore up their currencies
proved futile, as the actions of the central banks and finance minis-
ters were quickly overwhelmed. 7 1
Leaders in Italy and the U.K. decided to drop from the ERM,
exchanging collective security for the freedom to take stronger emer-
gency measures.72 Spain, too, devalued its currency in an effort to
curtail negative speculation, but remained within the limits of the
ERM.7 3
The devaluations gave rise to several effects, and while they are
of little legal consequence, the causal factors are direct enough to
note their impact."' In countries that devalue their currencies effec-
64. Id. Conventional market theories predict that such a move should encourage specu-
lators to move away from a downward moving currency and to invest in other markets where
the prospect for earning greater interest exists. However, currency traders' pessimism regard-
ing the prospects for long-term economic growth remained. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at
39.
65. Morning Edition (Sept. 14), supra note 63.
66. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 38.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 39.
69. An action that was required by the rules of membership in the ERM. Morning Edi-
tion (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 17, 1992) (Deborah Amos reporting) available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File (hereinafter Morning Edition (Sept. 17)].
70. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 39.
71. Id. at 38.
72. See supra note 37.
73. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
74. The upcoming referendum convinced Germany to lower its interest rates, which led
to massive currency speculation and sent the market into a tailspin. This forced the central
banks to devalue their currencies. Many analysts agreed that the currency turmoil reflected
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tively, the industrial sectors can generally expect good returns 7 5 De-
valuation of currency causes the value of export goods to rise, and
the price of competing import goods to increase. Therefore, manu-
facturers in those countries should be more profitable, and the na-
tions themselves should become more competitive on the interna-
tional markets. Consumers. in those countries, however, are
disadvantaged by devaluation: the increased cost of imported goods
and the inflation caused by devaluing currency. Yet, on the whole,
analysts believe devaluation is good for economic growth. 76
In the United States, European currency devaluation would dis-
advantage producers, just as it benefitted manufacturers in the de-
valued countries. Devaluation of the average European currency
would strengthen the U.S. dollar in comparison. Therefore, the rela-
tive cost of U.S. goods imported into the EC would rise, making
them less attractive to the European consumer.
Instead of deciding to break away and devalue its own currency,
France paid a very high price for remaining in the ERM. Facing
high inflation and rising unemployment, Paris could have chosen to
help French industry. Instead, the government chose not to, because
abandoning the ERM might have harmed chances of passing the
referendum.78
Across the Channel, the U.K. announced it would refuse to re-
join the ERM until changes were made in Germany's economic pol-
icy. 79 At minimum, Britain would await the outcome of the French
referendum before deciding whether to return the pound to the
ERM.80
Even after devaluation, the pound was down less than five per-
cent, but the damage was more than economic.81 Robin Oakley of
the market's doubts about French ratification of the Treaty. Hurdles, supra, note 21. See also,
Get Europe to Work, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1993, at 19.
75. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
76. Morning Edition (Sept. 17), supra note 69, (Renee Montagne reporting).
77. Id. As a hypothetical example, consider a widget which costs $20 to produce in the
U.S. that is normally bought by a French retailer for 80 French francs (ffr) assuming a 4 to I
exchange rate. If the franc is devalued, it will adjust the exchange rate to, say, 5 to I. Now the
same product, which still costs $20 to produce in the U.S., costs the French retailer 100 ffr.
The French retailer must pass the increased cost of the imported widgets on to the consumer.
The French consumer, in turn, will be more likely to buy a French widget which has not gone
through the exchange rate conversion. The price of French widgets have remained the same
while the American product's cost has increased. The French consumer is disadvantaged if
there is not an acceptable French widget on the market.
78. Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79. Germany had resisted worldwide demands to lower its interest rates further. Morn-
ing Edition (Sept. 18), supra note 8, (Bob Edwards reporting).
80. Morning Edition (Sept. 17), supra note 71. British Prime Minister John Major an-
nounced in May 1993 that England would not rejoin the ERM for the foreseeable future.
Boris Johnson, Major Seeks to Reassure Tory Rebels, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 20, 1993, p.
II.
81. Morning Edition (Sept. 18). supra note 8, (Bob Edwards reporting).
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The Times in London said it was "the biggest economic crisis in
Britain for twenty-five years, and it severely undermine[d] the au-
thority not only of the chancellor [of the exchequer], Norman La-
mont, but of John Major as Prime Minister [as well]." 82 By October,
John Major's approval rating had plummeted to sixteen percent, the
lowest since the British began taking opinion polls. 83 Not only had
the political reputations of Major and Lamont suffered, but the idea
of integration was also damaged politically in the U.K.84
Ironically, the inability of the ERM to protect the pound from
massive speculation is also a very strong argument in favor of Maas-
tricht's economic integration. The Treaty provides for a single Euro-
pean currency which would put an end to intra-European currency
speculation.85
C. The U.K. Calls for an Emergency Summit
At the time, the U.K. held the rotating Presidency of the Euro-
pean Community.86 In that capacity, Prime Minister Major called
an emergency summit of the EC leaders for October 16, 1992 in
Birmingham, England. 87 The announced purpose of the special sum-
mit was to resolve doubts held by the ruling Conservative Party and
the British citizenry concerning unification. 88 British ratification of
the Treaty seemed uncertain otherwise. But the results of the French
referendum changed the focus of the meeting toward addressing
public concerns. 89 The twelve EC leaders recognized the growing
need for public relations because so many Europeans are concerned
about a union created "in smoke-filled rooms, rather than people-
filled plazas." 90
As a result, the twelve agreed to emphasize the policy of sub-
sidiarity 1 Many Europeans worry about relinquishing sovereignty
to distant politicians in Brussells. 92 By stressing institutions of a
more democratic nature, and by defining the principle of sub-
sidiarity, the EC leaders hoped to reassure the populus that Maas-
82. Id. (Michael Goldfarb reporting).
83. Major: In the Pits, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1992, at 67.
84. Morning Edition (Sept. 18), supra note 8, (Bob Edwards reporting).
85. Hurdles, supra note 21.
86. Wang Shengliang, No High Hopes for EC Birmingham Summit, XINHUA GEN.
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File.
87. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
88. Shengliang, supra note 86.
89. Also influencing the outcome of the summit was the announcement on October 15 of
the shutdown of most of the state-run British coal industry, eliminating 30,000 jobs. Weekend
Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 17, 1992) (Deborah Amos reporting) availa-
ble in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
90. Id.
91. Id. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text (defining the principle of sub-
sidiarity in depth).
92. French Hunters, supra note 41.
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tricht accounts for both individuals and national tradition as it chugs
along the track toward closer unification.9"
VIII. Effects of Referendum on the Individual.
The referendum affects the individual primarily by forcing ex-
isting EC institutions to act more in accord with the provisions of the
unratified agreement.94 As a result, the EC could allay fears con-
cerning Maastricht through example. To quote Competition and Fi-
nancial Services Commissioner Leon Brittan: "There were several
lessons to learn from the vote and that the [EC] must now show that
it is capable of responding to the concerns underlying the no
votes."95 In particular, the outcome of the referendum caused EC
leaders to emphasize the principle of subsidiarity.96
The principle of subsidiarity effects every citizen in the Commu-
nity because it restricts otherwise ubiquitous EC law. While sub-
sidiarity as a legal principle is difficult to explicitly define, it essen-
tially means that the central institutions should not take action on
any issue where it would be more appropriate for the Member-States
to act. 97 Conversely stated, the Community should only act where
Member-States have made an express delegation of sovereignty, and
then only when it is necessary to do so.98
Since, however, the Member-States have made such broad dele-
gations of power,99 opponents of the Treaty say the principle does
not sufficiently restrict the EC's expansion. 100 For example, article
39 of the Treaty of Rome grants the EC the power to control agri-
cultural labor regulation. 0 ' Opponents would argue that subsidiarity
93. Weekend Edition, supra note 89, (EC President John Major reading from the final
declaration of the summit).
94. Proposed legislation for an EC professional card, identifiying the qualifications of
workers like a driver's license, has already been set aside; so have plans to harmonize small
business regulations. Dictionary Time, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1989, at 52.
95. Hurdles, supra note 21.
96. Weekend Edition, supra note 89.
97. Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty provides:
Art.3b: "The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objec-
tives of the proposed action CANNOT be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed ac-
tion, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty." (em-
phasis added).
EEC TREATY art. 3b (as proposed for amendment 1992).
98. Weekend Edition, supra note 89.
99. For example, one such area of exclusive EC competence can be summed up suc-
cinctly as Agriculture. EEC TREATY arts. 38-47 (collectively entitled: Part i, Foundations of
the Community; Title II, Agriculture).
100. Marshall, supra note 24.
101. EEC TREATY art. 39.
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is not specific enough to explain whether the EC could legitimately
prescribe uniform wage compensation for the agricultural work
force, or whether the different cost of living expenses in each Mem-
ber State would trigger subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity in the EC is a recent development. The Christian
Democrats in the European Parliament borrowed the term from
Pope Pius XI's 1931 encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno." The Vatican
used the concept to describe its pre-World War II policy of taking
decisions that affect people's lives as far down the chain of command
as possible."°2
The idea came to be used officially in the EC as early as
1982,'03 and was later incorporated into the Treaty of Maastricht. 104
Proponents of the Treaty have already cited subsidiarity on several
occasions to counter doubts raised by anti-unionists concerning the
relinquishment of sovereignty to Brussels.' 0 5 But, the results of the
French referendum will transform this relatively obscure term into
one of the guiding principles of European integration. 06
The aim of subsidiarity is to balance the competing interests of
preserving local sovereignty and furthering central unification. 07
Member-States relinquished to the EC certain areas of exclusive
competence to act which are strictly subject to the primacy of EC
law.1 08 In those areas not delegated to the EC, such as defense pol-
icy, the Member-States have retained exclusive control.
However, there are certain areas of EC competence which have
not been expressly delineated or in which the EC has not acted.
Member-States govern these areas under the principle of mutual rec-
ognition.' 0 9 Should the EC decide to legislate in these areas, how-
102. Dictionary Time, supra note 96.
103. A specific word search on LEXIS shows the earliest official mention of subsidiarity
to be July of 1982. Search of LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECLAW File (Nov. 15, 1992) (search
for records containing the term "subsidiarity" having a document-date before 1983). The
ECLAW File dates back to June 1979. While this is not conclusive of the date of introduction,
updating the document-date exclusion segment one year at a time does give an idea of how the
word subsidiarity has come into common official usage only recently. The same search, modi-
fied to "before 1990" retrieves only two cases. "Before 1991" pulls up five; 1992, a total of ten;
and a search without a date restriction retrieves 15 official records. A search of the CURRNT
File, using just the term "subsidiarity" as a search parameter, will be stopped because it will
retrieve more than one thousand records. Search of LEXIS, NExis Library, CURRNT File,
Nov. 15, 1992).
104. Marshall, supra note 24.
105. Del Duca, supra note 9 (manuscript at 16)
106. Despite its increasing usage, "subsidiarity" is not yet found in any dictionary. Dic-
tionary Time, supra note 96. See also, Lucy Halloway, Eurospeak Leaves Even the Brussels
Bureaucrats Tongue-Tied, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 1989, at 2 (spelling out some of the problems
of interpreting Europe's "ugliest and most baffling language").
107. Shengliang, supra note 86.
108. Case 6/64 Costa v. E.N.I.L.. 1964 E.C.R. 585 (establishing the supremacy of EC
law): see, e.g. Del Duca, supra note 9, (manuscript at 43).
109. Under this principle, recognition must be granted to the national legislation of
other Member-States in the absence of domestic imperatives of health, safety, or consumer
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ever, EC regulation will preempt national law. It is in these areas of
concurrent jurisdiction where problems arise.110
In theory, the principle of subsidiarity should determine which
law will govern, with a presumption in favor of national legislation.
Unfortunately, the vague nature of the principle leaves open many
possible interpretations."' Under a ratified Maastricht Treaty, the
job of delineating subsidiarity Would fall to the Court of Justice of
the European Communities." 2 However, public pressure is on the
EC leaders to develop a more specific definition in order to address
public concern with Maastricht. 113 Individuals should have the right
to know under which law they are governed, and most prefer their
own nation's laws. 1 4
.Ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht would also affect the
individual by granting nationals of all Member-States dual citizen-
ship."' Under Maastricht,. they would retain their national identi-
ties, but in addition, would be given European citizenship. The
Treaty would grant European citizens diplomatic and consular pro-
tection in any Member-State's embassy outside of the EC."6 Euro-
pean citizenship would entail the rights to reside, vote, and run for
political office in any Member-State. This would ensure free move-
ment of labor and people, but would also entail giving 'foreigners'
the right to vote in municipal elections. This issue is particularly sen-
sitive in France, because France's representative democracy relies
heavily upon regional officials. 1 7
Maastricht itself would also result in a more direct representa-
tion of the individual in Brussels. The European Parliament is the
only directly elected, representative institution of the EC. At present,
the Parliament is largely an advisory body with no direct legislative
powers."18 Maastricht would give the Parliament the power to amend
protection. Del Duca, supra note 9, (manuscript at 16).
110. For a precognitive discussion of some of the problems, see J.P. Warner, The Rela-
tionship Between European Community Law and the National Laws of the Member States,
93 LQ REV. 349 (1977).
111. The positions of the Member-States on subsidiarity are as follows. Denmark and
the United Kingdom are its strongest advocates, convincing Italy to support them. But the
other, poorer Member-States of Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain fear the loss of influence
and financial support if subsidiarity should weaken the EC Commission. Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands worry that it might be used to make Maastricht less effective as a
tool of integration. And while Germany subscribes to the principle because of domestic pres-
sures, France simply acknowledges its existence. Shengliang, supra note 86.
112. Just as the European Court of Justice defined the principles of the supremacy of
EC law and of mutual recognition. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
113. Hurdles, supra note 21.
114. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
115. Marshall, supra note 22, art. Ill.
116. Del Duca, supra note 9, (manuscript at 24).
117. Daly & Wickens, supra note 5, at 42.
118. See Marshall, supra note 24, art. II (describing the new powers of Parliament
under Maastricht). Cf. Zagorin, supra note 13, at Ill(B).
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and even veto legislation in specific areas." 9
Several provisions of Maastricht will affect entire groups of in-
dividuals. For example, the Treaty's environmental requirements
would constrain French hunters, fishers, and farmers. 20 In addition,
the entire telecommunications industry would fall within the purview
of Maastricht's regulations. 2'
More directly, the referendum itself had several effects upon the
individual which may serve as lessons for future national referen-
dums.'22 National referendums are necessarily of a political nature,
requiring concessions to individual factions. For example, in order to
bolster support for the referendum from France's powerful farming
lobby, the EC Commission drew up a special aid package. 2 3 In Den-
mark and Germany, growing disillusionment with unification may
require similar measures as well.' 2 "
Analysts believed that truckers, unhappy with the vote's out-
come because of increasing Community regulation of the transporta-
tion industry, may decide to blockade crucial highways. 2 5 There is
certainly precedent of similar action by the EC truckers on which to
base such a prediction.' 26 One analyst even suggested that French
Camembert makers would dump EC hygeine inspectors into the
cheese vats if they made inspections shortly after the referendum.' 27
Although such descriptions seem as exaggerated as the suggestion
that currency speculators will be beheaded in the Place de la Bastille
by consumers who support the French franc, they are indicative of
the growing public opposition to Maastricht. Each citizen, acting in-
dependently, can contribute to a collective, negative reaction to the
119. Marshall, supra note 24, art. Ill.
120. French Hunters, supra note 41.
121. Hilary Clarke, Survey of International Telecommunications, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1992, at Ill.
122. Examples of such national referendums include the Italian attempt to change their
proportional governmental system in April of 1993. See, e.g., All Things Considered (National
Public Radio broadcast, April 18, 1993) (Deborah Amos reporting) available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NPR File. Another attempt at such democratic national reform was the Rus-
sian referendum, also in April of 1993. See, e.g., All Things Considered (National Public
Radio broadcast, April 13, 1993) (Mike Shuster reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, NPR File. Each presented issues that became confused as the debate led up to the vote.
Id. And while many differences exist between the complexities of such issues and the French
referendum on Maastricht, many similarities may be drawn.
123. Scott Sullivan, Oh. for la Vie Paysanne: French Farmers Hand Mitterand a Hot
Potato, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7, 1992, at 36.
124. See Tyler Marshall and Joel Havemann, ECU, Brute!, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at
HI.
125. All Things Considered, supra note 43. See also Rioters, Police Clash After Danes
OK European Unity, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1993, at 6.
126. Alan Riding, Vote on Unity Clouding Mitterand's Vacation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1992, at A9 (hereinafter Riding, Vacation]; cf. Morning Edition (National Public Radio
broadcast, March 30, 1993) (Lynn Terry reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR
File.
127. All Things Considered, supra note 43.
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referendum. Nearly fifty percent of the voters in France are likely to
be resentful of the outcome of the referendum, if for no other reason
than that they voted against it.
IX. The Effects of the Referendum upon Institutions
Institutions have felt the direct impact of the referendum itself
more than the individual. Michael Cadmessus of the International
Monetary Fund said passage of the referendum "is good for France,
for Europe, and for the world." '12 He based this statement on the
assumption that passage of the referendum would strengthen Euro-
pean monetary cooperation. In turn, such cooperation would lead to
stronger economies in Europe. Greater economic strength in Europe
would allow for more investment funds, and an increased willingness
to provide these funds, for developing countries around the globe. 129
A. Model for the World
Not only would a stronger European economy help the global
economy, but it would help world leaders determine how to best
strengthen their own national economies. As one of the oldest and
most integrated of the modern regional organizations, less developed
associations will look to the EC experience before taking their own
steps toward integration.'"0 Free trade pacts in Latin America, 131
Southeast Asia, 32 North America,' 33 and Europel34 have all fol-
lowed at least some of the examples set by the EC. Furthermore,
national legal systems commonly make use of foreign solutions in
domestic problems. 3 5
International organizations will also utilize foreign solutions.
For instance, the Group of Seven industrial nations (G-7) is pres-
ently facing similar problems to those before the EC in its efforts to
promote a stronger global economy.' 36 In its economic declaration of
128. Hurdles, supra note 21; Contra Robert J. Samuelson, Europe, Our Former Ally,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1992, at 52 (standing for the position that such "foolish ambitions are
bad for Europe, bad for the United States and bad for the world").
129. See Economic Declaration Issued by Group of Seven Industrial Nations at the
Conclusion of Their Economic Summit in Houston July I1, 1990, 1990 Int'l. Trade Rep.
(BNA) para. 36 (July 18, 1990) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INTRAD File [hereinaf-
ter Economic Declaration].
130. See Del Duca, supra note 9 (manuscript at 2).
131. Julia Michaels, Latin Free Trade Pacts Proliferate, CHR. ScI. MON., Mar. 18,
1992, at 11.
132. Clayton Jones, Asia-Pacific Group Calls for Open Trade, CHR. ScL MON., Nov.
15, 1991. at 1.
133. See Frank Rutter, Clinton's Big But Could See the U.S. Backing out of NAFTA,
VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 7, 1992, at A10.
134. WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY. CLASS ACTIONS 4 (Lisa DelFiacco ed., 1992).
135. See. e.g. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J., 1953) (utilizing the comparative
method to apply foreign solutions to domestic law).
136. The G-7 is comprised of the world's seven largest industrial democracies: Canada,
Spring 1993]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1990, the G-7 nations specifically recognized the accomplishments of
the EC in nurturing self-sustained growth based on market princi-
ples in Eastern Europe. 137
Parties to the negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) hold the same goal as the G-7, but on a much
larger scale.1"8 Participants in the GATT negotiations decided to
await the results of the French referendum out of deference to the
EC's agricultural policies.139 France is the EC's largest agricultural
producer. 140 If the referendum had failed, the EC's economic unity
would have weakened. The EC's bargaining position would have
changed because its unified front of twelve nations voting as a bloc
would have been broken.
The European Economic Area (EEA) is a more specific exam-
ple of a regional organization taking the lessons of the French refer-
endum into account. The EEA is an attempt to allow the free move-
ment of capital, labor, goods, and services between the EC and the
seven nations of EFTA."" In order to ratify the EEA Treaty, the
EFTA nation of Switzerland is constitutionally required to pass a
national referendum." 2 Comparisons to the EC experience are sure
to follow. Switzerland's position is perhaps more akin to that of Den-
mark than of France in its strong currency, relative size, and history
of independence. However, the extensive coverage of the debate prior
to the French referendum and the existence of a common language
will cause Switzerland to look to neighboring France as well.
B. Effects upon EC Institutions
Fear of failure in subsequent ratifications caused the EC to
make concessions to England and Denmark. These concessions
watered down the Treaty considerably by derogations, or opt-out
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. Such problems include unemployment,
inflation and contributing to developing countries. Economic Declaration, supra note 129, at
para. 5-6.
137. Id. at para. 36.
138. GATT is an attempt to further liberalize trade in goods and services by reaching a
worldwide consensus to reduce tarriffs and other fiscal barriers to trade. Hurdles, supra note
21. It is widely viewed as important to growth in the global economy. Presently, talks are
delayed by policy differences between the EC and the United States regarding farming subsi-
dies. Adrian Croft, GATT's Dunkel Sees Window of Opportunity for World Trade Talks,
REUTERS, Sept. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File.
139. Id.
140. France Readies Last GATT Stand as Veto Calls Mount, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File. Popular agricultural subsidies from the
French government nearly led to a trade war with the U.S. when France threatened to veto a
tariff agreement between the EC and the U.S. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 122.
141. EFTA (the European Free Trade Area) comprises the nations of Austria, Finland,
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clauses.143
The narrow margin of the vote has encouraged the EC to pro-
ceed cautiously in its undertakings. As such, it has slowed the pro-
cess of introducing new members into the Community. 44 The cau-
tion engendered by the referendum also slowed the process of
ratification itself. Several Member-States' national parliaments de-
cided to await the outcome of the vote before acting on the
Treaty. 145 While Belgium and Italy moved ahead with the ratifica-
tion process,146 the other nations did not. The U.K. even went so far
as to declare that it would not consider ratification until the Danish
veto was resolved. 47
The Danish Constitution, like that of Switzerland, required rati-
fication by popular referendum.1 48 However, in June, 1992, the
Danes narrowly rejected a referendum on Maastricht, which in the-
ory should have killed any chance for unanimous ratification.1 49 Den-
mark is prohibited by law from resubmitting the same treaty to a
new vote.1 50 Possibly, however, a re-interpretation of the Treaty
would have sufficed to meet this requirement.1 51 In either event, the
Danish voters remained a major obstacle to ratification.
Deciding they would find a solution to the Danish veto later, the
other Member-States pressed on throughout the Summer of 1992
with the ratification process. 2 The results of the French referen-
dum, however, left EC foreign ministers at odds over how to solve
143. See Andres Wolberg-Stok, Danes' "Yes" Frees EC to Resume Debate on Way
Ahead, REUTERS, May 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File; Boris
Johnson, The Danes Have Set Us on the Road to a Showdown, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 19,
1993, at 16: and Lionel Barber, EC Must Now Make the Treaty Work, FIN. TIMES, May 20,
1993, at 2.
144. Cf., Hurdles, supra note 21 (standing for the proposition that the process of acces-
sion of new members has been altered, rather than slowed down, by the results of the
referendum).
145. Riding, Europe, supra note 18.
146. The Belgian Chamber of Representatives approved ratification 146 to 33. The Sen-
ate had yet to consider the Treaty by the time of the referendum. FACTS ON FILE, supra note
3.The Italian Senate passed the measure 176 to 16. The Chamber of Deputies was expected to
announce its decision by the end of October 1992. Id.
147. British law requires a line-by-line consideration of the proposals to bring its consti-
tution in line with the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. The process is made even more
difficult by the fact that Britain's Parliament is the most skeptic in the Community toward
unification. Morning Edition (Sept. 18), supra note 8, (Michael Goldfarb reporting); see also
Russell Watson, In Europe, Three's a Crowd, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1992, at 54.
148. Marshall and Havemann, supra note 124.
149. Riding, Europe, supra note 18, at Al. The referendum was held June 6, 1992 and
failed, with a majority of 50.7% against the Treaty. Shengliang, supra note 86. Such opposi-
tion to the Treaty came as something of a surprise, because a large portion of the Danish
government had until that time been very supportive of European Union. Additional problems
face the Community in Denmark now that Premier Poul Schlouter, the EC's main supporter
there, has resigned from office due to an unrelated scandal. See, e.g., Morning Edition (Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 15, 1993) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
150. Riding, Europe, supra note 18, at A12.
151. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
152. Riding, Europe, supra note 18, at Al2.
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problems of interest rates, currency levels, deadlines, and public rela-
tions. 158 The foreign ministers did agree that there would not be a
re-negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty.154 This decision would not,
however, preclude the possibility of a re-interpretation of the Treaty.
Denmark felt that a much expanded definition of subsidiarity,
greater emphasis on the Treaty's environmental protections, and a
strong affirmation of continuing national sovereignty regarding for-
eign policy might give Danish voters reason to reconsider. 155
On September 22, 1992, Denmark announced that a second ref-
erendum on Maastricht would be held in mid-1993.156 The Danish
government would promote a re-interpretation of Maastricht based
on a national policy of qualified support for integration within the
confines of the Union.1 57
While this does sound propagandistic - like the Danish govern-
ment was trying to fool its electorate by putting new wine in an old
bottle - it does make sense. Maastricht does not automatically pro-
vide for a common defense, which was one of the Danes' largest wor-
ries about the Treaty. Maastricht simply sets common defense as a
goal to be achieved sometime in the future by the Member-States. "
By ratifying Maastricht and working within the European Union,
Denmark could seek to slow integration by advocating caution as a
matter of policy. The Danish government could promise to represent
such policies in the Union in exchange for ratification by the voters
in the second referendum.
In order to communicate such a message, however, supporters
of the Treaty within the Danish government should look to the les-
sons of the French referendum. For example, the French government
has been accused of waiting too long before distributing hastily pre-
pared copies of the Treaty. 159 Moreover, the months of debate be-
tween supporters and detractors of the Treaty shifted the focus of
the referendum. 60 A referendum on France, rather than the EC, un-
dermined support for the Treaty. Therefore, Danish leaders needed
to make an effort to keep the focus of the second referendum on the
Treaty itself.
153. Moneyline (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 21, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CNN File.
154. Id. In fact, most EC leaders are adamant in this position. Shengliang, supra note
86.
155. Michael Binyan & Peter Riddell, Ministers Tread Path Strewn with Hurdles, THE
TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 1992, available on LEXIS, Nexis Library, TTIMES File.
156. FACTS ON FILE, supra note 3.
157. Id. For explanation of European Union, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
158. Marshall, supra note 24 art. VI.
159. See Will, supra note 29.
160. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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C. Effects in France
The idea of a two-speed Europe resulted from the Danish rejec-
tion of Maastricht and from the British, Italian, and Spanish cur-
rency devaluations. A two-speed Europe describes the notion that
France and Germany might integrate their currencies ahead of the
rest, leaving the other, more recalcitrant Member-States to climb
aboard further down the track. However the narrow margin of the
referendum showed a reluctance on the part of the French people
toward immediate unification. That reluctance forced French and
German leaders to set the idea of a two-speed Europe aside, at least
temporarily." 1
Rather than joining their currencies ahead of the other Mem-
ber-States, French and German leaders have instead decided to pro-
mote social unity. French President Mitterand and his cultural min-
ister, Jack Lang, are currently promoting the idea of ARTE-TV. 62
Based on the idea that a shared experience will promote cultural un-
derstanding, ARTE is an attempt to simultaneously broadcast the
same television programs, in both France and Germany, in each
country's respective language.'68 French and German leaders hope to
produce results like that of America's cable revolution, where nation-
wide television broadcasts created a collective social consciousness.164
Following France and Germany, the Belgians are expected to begin
airing ARTE broadcasts sometime in the near future. 165
X. Conclusion: The Maastricht Train
The effects of the French referendum approving ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty have been felt worldwide both economically
and as a lesson to other regional organizations which may choose to
submit their ideas to the direct vote of the people. 6 The results of
the referendum have had a more direct impact within the European
Community. The narrow margin of the vote has alerted leaders in
France and throughout the EC to the concerns of the public regard-
161. See Watson, supra note 147. Compare The Danes Got it Right Twice, INT'L
HEARLD TRIB., May 21, 1993 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
162. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 13, 1992) (Deborah
Amos reporting) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File.
163. Id.
164. A collective consciousness is based upon the pervasive social influence of television
and the shared, common experience over its viewing area. See generally, GEORGE COMSTOCK.
TELEVISION IN AMERICA 123-49 (1980).
165. Franco-German TV Provides Dead Parrots Perch, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 29,
1992, (Overseas News), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TTIMES File.
166. Instead of other regional associations looking to the EC experience, perhaps the EC
should take time to learn from others. In particular, the nations of Latin America have placed
an almost singular emphasis on creating and establishing stable money. Their success has
turned their economies almost completely around. David Malpass, Europeans Should Look
West for Advice on Sound Money, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1992, at A9.
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ing European unification.'" The vote has also resulted in greater em-
phasis of the legal principle of subsidiarity. This emphasis will result
in a slower, more cautious journey toward integration.
The outcome of the French vote encourages better public rela-
tions between the*EC and its citizens. Brussels will be more likely to
open up its doors to interested parties before enacting legislation,
and then use more easily understood language in its enactment.
While this may slow the legislative process, greater care should re-
sult in a more democratic EC with well-considered, and fewer, rules.
Many obstacles remain to ratification. The Danish veto and a
hostile British Parliament have been overcome before Maastricht
can take effect. However, the dissatisfaction with integration ex-
pressed by the French referendum may only be a symptom of a
growing sentiment throughout Europe. 16'8 Rising unemployment and
protectionism throughout Europe, and the questions of Eastern Euro-
pean accession to the EC remain problematic. A catalyst is required
to stimulate the perception of the need for further integration. The
interests of politicians, lobbyists, and academicians in unification are
not enough to galvanize the European public into action.'19
When the nations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands decided to begin their journey toward
integration, it was a direct result of the ravages of war in Europe.
War, economic strife, and unacceptable standards of living are all
present as they were when the ECSC Treaty was put into effect.
However, the civil war in the east, the poverty of the south, and the
rising unemployment in the north may appear marginal, or distant,
to the voters in France. It remains for the EC leaders to convince
their public that these problems are real and that Maastricht is the
best solution.'7
Yet, even should a catalyst stimulating the progress of the EC
toward greater unity fail to appear, the present state of affairs is a
remarkable achievement. The Common Market has produced tangi-
ble benefits for Europeans in the freedom of movement of goods, ser-
vices, capital and people; and, the EC has produced a better stan-
dard of living for all Europeans. Moreover, the Member-States'
governments have benefitted from the reduced threat of war and so-
cial strife, while other regional organizations have received the bene-
167. Some may say the rejection of the Danish referendum served the same purpose.
But Denmark's relatively small size and history of independence are vastly different from
France's size and position as a founding member and strong proponent of integration.
168. See Marshall & Havemann, supra note 124.
169. See generally, LAURA TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY (1977) (describing the his-
tory and need for referendums).
170. Close Call for European Unity, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Sept. 22, 1992,
at A8.
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fits of Europe's experience in cooperative integration.
The present Common Market can be described as a train travel-
ling down the track toward integration. The locomotives of this train
are France and Germany. The economic size and strength of these
two founding members of the Community make them the largest
contributors to the EC.11' France and Germany are the strongest ad-
vocates of unification, contemplating a two-speed Europe and pro-
moting innovative ideas such as ARTE-TV.
Another original member of the EC, Belgium, can also be con-
sidered an engine in the Maastricht train. Belgium's planned partici-
pation in ARTE, its strong economy, and its decision to continue the
ratification process rather than await the outcome of the referendum
show Belgium's enthusiasm for unification.
Like their more enthusiastic neighbor, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands were founding members of the Community. Their rela-
tive wealth, and their concern that too much emphasis on sub-
sidiarity might weaken the Treaty, place them near the head of the
train.
The remaining original member, Italy, is in the middle of the
train. Italy's membejrship in the G-7 ranks it as one of the world's
leading industrial powers, yet the ambivalent nation dropped from
the ERM and devalued its lira during the currency crisis. While it
continued the ratification process, instead of waiting for the results
of the French referendum, Italy was more supportive of the retention
of sovereignty inherent in the principle of subsidiarity.
The poorer states of Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain
strongly support the progress toward integration because it brings
them financial support and prosperity. This support for integration is
reflected in their positions regarding subsidiarity; all are concerned
that it might weaken the EC Commission, which might in turn
lessen their influence in and support from the Community. Yet, it is
that'same economic backwardness which slows the Maastricht train
and places them figuratively toward the rear. The wealthier nations
are forced to pull them along in their development. Their financial
need saps enthusiasm from nations such as France, and gives Den-
mark and the U.K. another reason to resist unification.
As the caboose of the Maastricht train, Britain and Denmark
are the least enthusiastic members of the EC regarding the prospects
of integration. The Danish rejection of the Treaty and the hostility
in British parliamentary ratification sidetracked the Maastricht train
for nearly one year. Once those obstacles were overcome, there was
still no guarantee that the course would be a downhill track from
171. Marshall & Havemann, supra note 124.
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there. 1 2
A slower advance toward European unity does face the threat of
stagnation. But even if the train stalls, the present Common Market
is a remarkable achievement. The presence of war, economic strife,
and unacceptable standards of living in Europe, however, suggest
that the train will continue, whether by way of Maastricht or some
other track. All the essential ingredients are present. What remains
is to convince the public of their existence, and that further integra-
tion is a solution. Conversely, a too rapid advance causes much up-
heaval of the status quo and in the people who have vested interests
in the Community. The currency crisis and the need to placate
French farmers and truckers are examples of this upheaval. Such a
train is in greater jeopardy of derailing than of losing momentum.
After all, a train hurtling down the track is less likely to stall going
up a hill, but more likely to derail when it hits a sharp curve.
Matthew J. Eshelman
172.
[If Britain and the Danes had baled out, there would have been a move towards
a much greater federal system, I think, by the French and the Germans, perhaps
the Italians . . . In the long run, we'll probably be dead grateful to the Danes
for having made everybody in Europe stop and think exactly what kind of Eu-
rope are we getting [in] for. Is it a creation of bureaucrats in Brussels, or does it
have organic support on the part of the people?
All Things Considered (May 20), supra note 27. See also supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
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